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Epistemology and Scientific Methodology in Āyurveda: The Means of Valid Knowledge According to the Rasavaiśeṣikasūtra and its Commentary by Narasiṃha

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THE QUESTION of the “means of valid knowledge” (*pramāṇa*), of their nature, number, etc., is a hotly contested epistemological issue among Indian philosophers, be they Buddhist, Jain or Brahmanical and, among the latter, this debate is engaged in according to the various “points of view” (*darśana*), more or less orthodox, within which their theory of knowledge is embedded. The text presented here sheds new light on this issue, for it treats it in a medical, scientifically pragmatic perspective rather than a speculative one.

The *Rasavaiśeṣikasūtra* (henceforth RVS) and its commentary (henceforth RVSBh) were published in Trivandrum in 1928 on the basis of a single palm-leaf manuscript written in Malayalam script.¹ The manuscript, old and damaged (it has a few lacunae), was preserved among the eight families belonging to the subcaste of Nambudiri Brahmins called Ashtavaidyans (*aṣṭavaidya*), who

¹ Ed. Menon (1928). A new edition was made on the basis of the former, by Muthuswami (1976). The *sūtras* with a new Sanskrit gloss *Prakāśikā* authored by Vaidyabhushanam K. R. Thirumulpad were published in Ollur (Thaikkattussery), Vaidyaratnam Ayurveda College, in 1993 (not seen), and a subsequent English translation of the *sūtras* and of the commentary by the same, was issued in 27 parts in the Kottakkal periodical *Āryavaidyan* (Thirumulpad 1994–2002), and thereafter as a book (Thirumulpad 2010: repr. 2013). See the reviews of the latter by Prasad

(2012) and Suma (2021). The Sanskrit text provided by Thirumulpad sometimes slightly differs from the original; the numbering of the *sūtras* is also different: in *adhyāya* 1, it takes into account the absence of *sūtra* 64, joins *sūtras* 118–119, and omits *sūtra* 150, for a total of 3 subtracted *sūtras*; an additional *sūtra*, conjectured in a footnote of the 1928/1976 ed., is inserted after 2,52; in *adhyāya* 3, *sūtra* 9 is divided into 9–16, *sūtras* 94–95 and 97–98 are joined, and a new *sūtra* is added after 102 (= 108), for a total of 3 additional *sūtras*.

were traditional court physicians in Kerala.² This collection of aphorisms (*sūtra*) is attributed to a Bhadanta Nāgārjuna, and the commentary (*bhāṣya*) that explains them to a Narasiṃha.³ While their respective identities and dates (fourth to fifth and seventh to eighth centuries CE?) are still debated, it appears that both of them were Buddhist physicians.⁴ As far as the *sūtras* are concerned, Jean Filliozat over-optimistically believed he could identify typically

2 See Menon 1928: 20–21. The manuscript belonged to the Chirattaman (Ciraṭṭaman) Illam, where already in ca 1920 it had been borrowed from “Narayanan Paramesvaran Moos” for a while, to be copied in Trivandrum (T. G. Sastri 1923: 13 no. 96–97). From there, it would have passed to the Vayaskara illam (these two Nambudiri *illams* are in the vicinity of Kottayam), where it was still to be found at the end of the twentieth century according to the listing by Sarma (2002: 198 n° 3034); it is no longer listed then, by the same, in the collection of Olassa (Olaśśa) Narayanan Mooss from the Chirattaman illam (see Rama Rao 2005: 189 no. 2065; MS Vayaskara Illam no. 73). Thereafter (following information kindly provided by Zimmermann; see also Zimmermann 1989: 41–43), because of the extinction of family branches and subsequent redistributions of their heritage among other families of Ashtavaidyans, the manuscript should have reached, with the rest of the manuscript collection of Vayaskara N. S. (and Aryan Narayanan) Mooss (Mūs), the Thaikat (Taikkāt) illam in Thrissur (whose manuscript library deserves to be visited in this respect). The incomplete copy (the Devanagari transcript of the *sūtras* only) of the original manuscript once made in Trivandrum (see Mahādeva Śāstrī 1939: 1873–1874, gen. no. 1305 = cat. no. 859) is now in the Oriental Research Institute and Manuscripts Library of the University of Kerala (MS Trivandrum ORIML T.505).

3 See the last colophon of RVSBh: *iti bhadantanāgārjunasya pravrajitasya vaidyendrasya rasavaiśeṣikasūtrasya narasiṃhakṛtaṃ bhāṣyaṃ samāptam*.

4 J. Filliozat (1979: x–xiii) argues that the author of the *sūtra*-text is the same

as the famous Buddhist doctor founder of the Madhyamaka school. Meulenbeld (HIML: vol 2A, 136–138, 2B 53–156) does not agree and refers to later datings (fifth century CE) in connection with a Bhadanta Nāgārjuna mentioned, by the disciple of his disciple, in one inscription from Jaggayyapeta monastery, dated ca. 450–600 CE (Mabbett (1998: 335–336 and 345) concludes, by contrast, that the Nāgārjuna of this inscription is the same as the Madhyamaka philosopher). Meulenbeld (*ibid.*) also points out that the earliest quotations from the RVS are from the tenth century (however, the four *rasavaiśeṣike* references in Candrāta seem to rather allude to Narasiṃha’s *bhāṣya*, whereas the *nāgārjunācāryokta* of Ḍaḷhaṇa is *sūtra* 1,31), and that Narasiṃha, on the one hand, should be later than Subandhu’s *Vāsavadattā* (ca 600 CE), to which he refers in RVSBh 1,2, and, on the other hand, does not yet quote Vāgbhaṭa (seventh century?) as an authority. Even if the noteworthy reference to Subandhu appears in fact to concern a lost, probably earlier, play entitled *Vāsavadattā*[-*Nāṭyadhārā*], not the famous romance, the quotation of Candrakīrti’s *Prasannapadā* (also ca 600; see below) confirms the latter’s date as the terminus post quem for the *bhāṣya*. One more argument for the early date of the *sūtras* is the reference in RVS 2,111 to the different opinions of “the disciples of Varṣagaṇa” – *vārṣaganyāḥ* (a pre-*Sāṃkhyakārikās* doctor; see Larson 1979: 140–144) and of “the ones of Ulūka” – *aulūkyāḥ* (a Vaiśeṣika doctor often identified with Kaṇāda), on the fact that the *indriyas* originate from the *ahaṃkāra* or from the *bhūtas*, respectively, as pointed out by Sankaranarayana and Pavana (2016: 4).

Buddhist statements about the non-perceptibility of substances (*dravya*) and their absence of intrinsic being (*svabhāva*).⁵ The extracts from the commentary presented here at least tend to confirm the (not at all exclusive) Buddhist nature of the *bhāṣya*, which proclaims the non-conceptual (*avikalpa*) character of perception and appears to quote from the Buddhist logician Dignāga and Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (i.e., the authoritative commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*, dated ca 600 CE).⁶ Furthermore, they point towards the specifically medical approach of its author, physician-and-scientist (*vaidya*), something which is apparent throughout the work.⁷

⁵ See J. Filliozat 1979: xii–xiii, quoting RVS 2,1 (*dravyam anyad guṇebhyo nāsty agrahaṇāt*) and 3,60 (*dravyasvabhāvaḥ... acintyaḥ*). In fact, the first *sūtra* only states that substances beyond qualities do not exist (cf. Thirumulpad's translation: "There is no *dravya* in addition to the properties as *dravya* is not experienced separately"). As for the second *sūtra*, compare Filliozat's translation ("l'être propre de la substance est inconcevable") and Thirumulpad's one (= 3,67: "the inherent nature of the *dravya*... cannot be determined by reasoning"). As rightly pointed out by one reviewer, regarding RVS 2,1, it is clear both from Filliozat's discussion and from the explanation provided in the RVSBh that this *sūtra* reflects the view of a *pūrva-pakṣin*, rather than that of the *siddhāntin*. Similarly, the statement in RVS 3,60 when considered in the context of the *sūtra*-text alone, does not appear to deny the *svabhāva* of *dravyas*. Rather, it seems to suggest that *svabhāva* is generally — or, as the commentator explains, under certain conditions and from a particular perspective — unfathomable, that is, inaccessible to intellectual inquiry. Accordingly, the following *sūtra* 3,61 concludes that, in the context of medical treatment, *āgama* is the very (first) means of valid knowledge (cf. footnotes 36 and 41 below).

⁶ Mejer (2002: 90–92) has also shown that the portion of RVSBh 1,1, on the different meanings of the particle *nañ*, is directly inspired by Vasubandhu's *Pratītyasamutpādayākyā* (in which the same anonymous grammatical [?] stanza is quoted; this stanza, as noted by one reviewer, is also

quoted, without ascription, later on in the Kerala tradition, i.e., in the first third of the fourteenth century, by Pūrṇasarasvatī in his commentary on Bhavabhūti's *Māla-tīmādhava* A.9 st.48, ed. Mahādeva Śāstrī 1953: 563). As it will be shown below, quoted (without ascriptions) or parallel passages, for the portion of RVSBh here studied, are found in *Carakasamhitā*, *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, *Yuktidīpikā* and other early commentaries to the *Sāṃkhya-kārikās* 4–5, and in the so-called Vyāsa's *bhāṣya* to the *Yogasūtras* (also called *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*) 1,7. Sankaranarayana and Pavana (2016: 6) have, for their part, pointed out quotations, elsewhere in RVSBh, from *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, *Carakasamhitā*, *Suśrutasaṃhitā* and *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, but with ascriptions there are only a few references (and most of them untraced) to *Sāṃkhya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Akṣapāda* (= Gotama, author of the *Nyāyasūtras*), *Bharadvāja* (1,2; see footnote 35 below.), *Caraka* (1,6), *Nimi* (3,36; 4,30), *Suśruta* (1,6) and *Urabhra* (3,36)'s opinions; see also HIML: vol 2A, 138.

⁷ See the last three *śloka*s quoted by Narasiṃha (*ad sūtra* 4,73: *karmanāś ca siddhau sarvārthasiddhiḥ* "when there is success in the [medical] act, there is success in all the aims," these aims being explained as the four traditional ones: *dharma-artha-kāma-mokṣa*). The first, also quoted *ad* 1,3, corresponds to CS 1,1.15cd-16ab (*dharmārthakāma-mokṣaṇām ārogyaṃ mūlam uttamam / rogās tasyāpahartārah śreyaso jīvitasya ca*), the second is untraced (*tasmāt prajñāvatā pūruṣeṇārogya[sya] sādhanam / sata-taṃ yatna āstheyas tanmūlāḥ sarvasaṃpadah*),

The two introductory stanzas, which are composed by Narasiṃha and precede Nāgārjuna's first *sūtra*, thus refrain from invoking any deity and stress the purely scientific approach of both the *Sūtra* and the *Bhāṣya* (see the appendix at the end for the Sanskrit text):

Because it is based on science (*prajñā*), does not have a single object (*eka-viṣaya*), is to be understood according to the scriptures/the doctrine (*śāstra*) and cannot yet be understood if one leaves the clear ground of examination (*parīkṣā*), this [*Sūtra* that Nāgārjuna has pro]claimed⁸ is, as a fruit, the supreme clairvoyance [offered] to those learned in the concepts (*padārtha*) and realities (*tattva*) of Āyurveda.

It is for this [*Sūtra*], in order to rejoice the learned [and/or] to help the dull-witted, for ever, that I have composed the present Commentary: thanks to it, the semantic difficulties (*artha-gaṇa*) are resolved on the basis of other proven conclusions/established tenets (*siddhānta*); it conforms to causes, objects and realities (*hetu-artha-tattva*); having renounced the path of meaning (*artha-padaṇī*) by plural extension (*aneka-vipaṇcana*), it consists of words that have pertinent meanings (*vyakta-artha*); thanks to it, the semantic fields (*artha-viṣaya*) are well examined (*su-parīkṣita*).

The “*Sūtra* on the specifics of taste(s),” as J. Filliozat called the work, is treatise on “medical philosophy and particularly on materia medica” (*idem*), that is to say on the very principles of pharmacology (*dravyaguṇa-vijñāna*).⁹ It thus has

and the third corresponds to *Udānavarga* 26.6a+d (cf. *Dhammapada* 204): *ārogyaṃ paramo lābho nirvāṇaḥ paramaṃ sukham*. This last *pāda*, Buddhist in its origin, could of course be read in a Vedāntic way, but Narasiṃha's own very last concluding stanza clearly states that “those learned in the realities, after having left aside the self-based haughtiness and fully explored the verbal path, reach the ultimate perfection” (...*vihāya unnaṭim ātmasaṃsthāṃ sarvatra vācaḥ padavīm parīkṣya / saṃprāpyate yat paramārthasiddhiḥ... tattvavidbhiḥ* //).

⁸ For the lacuna in this *śārdūlavikrīḍita* stanza, I suggest to read [*yat sūtram suviśiṣṭasarvarasadaṃ nāgārjunaḥ prā*] *bravīd*, instead of *tac chāstram rasabhaiddikābhidaṃ idaṃ nāgārjunaḥ prā*° proposed by the editors (and taken for granted in the intr.

1928, p. 8), in order to have a demonstrative (*idam*) and a relative (*yad*) in correlation with the (conjectured) subject *sūtram*. In addition, in *pāda* b *sādhigantum* has been emended into *ca+adhigantum* and *amalā* into *amalaṃ* (°*aṃ* and °*ā* can be easily confused in Malayalam hand-script; *sā*° and *cā*° possibly also).

⁹ I borrow here from J. Filliozat (1979:xi) some elements of his presentation of the work. A more detailed description of the contents is provided by Muthuswami (1976: xxxiv–xlv), Meulenbeld (HIML: vol 2A, 136–137), Ajithkumar (2020: 129–133) and Suma (2021); see also (in a sometimes confused manner) Sankaranarayana and Pavana (2016).

nothing to do with a treatise on alchemy, as the *rasa-* in its title might at first misleadingly suggest (if one takes this word in the sense it has acquired in this latter tradition).¹⁰ In Āyurveda *rasa* refers to “the sap of substances [*dravya*]”, the taste “that carries their properties [*guṇa*] and produces their activity [*karman*]” (Id.); and these tastes, which combine and interact with each other, are six in number: sweet, sour, salty, pungent, bitter and astringent (*madhura-amla-lavaṇa-kaṭuka-tikta-kaṣāyāḥ ṣaḍ rasāḥ*, RVS 3,2). This treatise is highly interesting for a number of reasons, as is indeed its commentary,¹¹ for which the task of producing an integral translation and of identifying the many anonymous citations still remains to be done.

The aphorism that will concern us here, the seventieth of the fourth *adhyāya*, at the very end of the work (the fourth before last; cf. the appendix at the end for the Sanskrit text), deals with the six “means of valid knowledge” (*pramāṇa*):

“Perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), [identification by] comparison (*upamāna*; cf. “recognition of likeness” MW), tradition (*āgama*), implication (*arthāpatti*) and inclusion (*saṁbhava*) are the means of valid knowledge.” (RVS 4,70)

Here is the commentary by Narasiṃha:¹²

These indeed are the [six] *pramāṇas*, that is, the means of knowing (*adhigama-upāya*) the wordly and otherwordly objects, “for knowledge of the knowable objects (*prameya*) rests on the means of valid knowledge” as it is said.¹³ Means of valid knowledge, knowable

¹⁰ See, for instance, referring to RVS, Renou 1963: 173 (“En chimie...”), or White 1996: 431 fn. 196 (“one of a number of Keralan works on therapeutic alchemy”). There is a homonymous, unpublished, *Rasavaiśeṣika* work in *śloka*s which appears to conform to this latter type (cf. Rama Rao 2005: 189 no. 2066: one manuscript in Mysore and a possible fragment in Madras).

¹¹ The scholarly interest in the RVS(Bh) has started to grow after its 1976 re-edition; see, beside J. Filliozat 1979, its use by Wezler 1990: 144–145 (RVS(Bh) 1,2 and 1,83); Meulenbeld 2001: 6 fn. 16, 12 (RVS 2,30–36 on *vīrya*) and 15 (RVS(Bh) 4,1–30 on *vīrya*); Das 2003: 266 fn. 904, 274 fn. 937 (verse quoted in RVS(Bh) 1,6), 422 fn. (RVS(Bh) 1,21 seems to be the source of Ḍalhaṇa for the same

quoted verse on *viśakanyā*) and 530 (RVS(Bh) 1,6 on *ojas* from semen); Sankaranarayana 2013: 197–198 (on RVS(Bh) 1,1). Again also in Kerala (at the least) after its 2010 English translation; see Murali 2014 (providing references to Malayalam commentaries and studies on the RVS), Sankaranarayana and Pavana 2016; Sreelakshmi 2018.

¹² Cf. for the same *sūtra*, the commentary by Thirumulpad (2010: 224–226) (203–205 of the 2002 ed.).

¹³ The quotation corresponds word-by-word to Candrakīrti’s *Prasannapadā* (de La Vallée Poussin 1903–13: vol 1, 55/14): *pramāṇādhīnatvāt prameyādhigamasya*. Cf. the English translation of the passage by Stcherbatsky (1975: 204 = 1977: 143). See also Arnold 2005: 145–146, who notes,

object, knower (*pramātr*) and [resulting] knowledge (*pramiti*):¹⁴ these are the four terms according to which mundane experience (*vyavahāra*) proceeds. As in the example of rice, the object to be measured (*prameya*) consists in the precise determination of that which is received; for the sake of the determination of which, a measure/instrument as criterion (*pramāṇa*), for instance the *prastha* (weight unit),¹⁵ is used; as measurer (*pramātr*) Devadatta with his hand, measuring (present participle *pra-mi*, °*miṇoti*) by means of a measure such as the *prastha*, produces the resulting measure (*pramiti*), [which is] the determination of the quantity (*iyattā*) of the rice or of some other thing. It is said that by possessing this [resulting] knowledge one experiences (*vyavaharati*). [Lacuna]¹⁶ By means of the *pramāṇas*, such as perception, etc., the physician (*vaidya*), as *pramātr*, observing the *prameyas* that are the objects of the scriptures (*śāstra*), on the basis of this-and-that *pramāṇa*, produces a clear ascertainment (*pratīti*) that is called right knowledge (*samyagjñāna*), for it proofs (*sādhaka*) everything. It is said indeed:

“To the intellect (*buddhi*), scriptures are intelligible (*bodhya*)¹⁷ by means of accurate (*sūkṣma*) ascertainments (*niścaya*) of the true nature/meaning of realities (*tattvārtha*); [however,] such an intellect that apprehends the true nature of realities is not found everywhere.”

As far as a definition of the characteristics of these [*pramāṇas*, namely] perception, etc., is concerned, we will not [here] proceed with an [in-

p. 262 fn. 13, that Candrakīrti reshapes here (and p. 59/4: *pramāṇādhiṇaḥ prameyādhi-gamaḥ*) an earlier statement by Dignāga, *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1.1.10 (*svavṛtti ad k. 1*), the (lost) Sanskrit text of which could have been: *pramāṇādhiṇo hi prameyādhi-gamaḥ*, following the reconstruction of Hattori (1968). The expression *laukika-lokottara-* is commonly found in classical Buddhist texts for designating *dharma*s etc. (see TLB s.v.).

¹⁴ See NSBh 1.1.1: (*arthavati ca*) *pramāṇe pramātā prameyaṃ pramitiṃ iti (...)* *pramātā, sa yenārthaṃ pramiṇoti tat pramāṇam, yo 'rthaḥ pramiṇyate tat prameyam, yad arthavijñānaṃ sā pramitiḥ, catasṛṣu caivaṃvidhāsu (...)*; and 4.1.41: *pramātā pramāṇaṃ prameyaṃ pramitiṃ iti*. However, the order of the words here given is more in conformity with the order of words in the compound *pramāṇa-prameya-pramātr-pramitiṣu* given by Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2.2.33.

¹⁵ See *Yuktiṭīpikā ad SK 4d*: *yathā vṛthiyādi-prameyaṃ prasthādīnā pramāṇena paricchidyate*. The same measure unit of the *prastha* for exemplifying the *pramāṇa* is to be found in Gauḍapada and Māṭhara's commentaries *ad loc.* (See also the parallel passage in Kauṇḍinya's *Pañcārthabhāṣya* to *Pāśupata-sūtra* 1, ed. R. A. Sastri 1940: 7, pointed out by Hara 1992: 217).

¹⁶ The few *aṣṭaras* lacuna which ends with a word having the final syllable *-bhaḥ* could correspond to a short sentence introduced by the previous closing *iti* (giving the source of the quotation, if it is one; or in the form of a commentarial expression), unless it is the beginning of the next sentence (cf. the text of the ed., without *danḍa*).

¹⁷ The 1928 ed. writes *buddhirboddhyāni*, the 1976 one *buddherboddhyāni*: *buddher* is indeed better. This citation remains untraced.

depth] examination, since other treatises (*tantra*) have dealt with this. Just a little bit will be said nonetheless.

Perception [is] sensory knowledge (*indriya-jñāna*) that is non-conceptual (*avikalpa*),¹⁸ such as knowledge of a taste or of a form-and-colour: it is called *pratyakṣa* because it functions in relation to (*prati*) each of the [five] senses (*akṣa*).¹⁹

Inference (*anumāna*) [is] an ascertainment (*pratipatti*), starting from the vision of a clue (*liṅga*), concerning the bearer of this clue (*liṅgin*): it is called *anumāna* because there is knowledge after (*paścāt* = *anu*-) the knowledge of the clue and the subsequent recollection (*anusmaraṇa*) of the relation (*saṁbandha*) [that exists between the clue and its bearer].²⁰

Comparison (*upamāna*) is the determination (*sādhana*) of something undetermined by [comparison with] something that is well-determined:²¹ because it is like the *mudga* (the mung bean, a very common vegetable) which is astringent (*stambhana*), so it is called “*mudga* leaf” (*mudga-parṇī*) (a less common leguminous plant).²²

¹⁸ Non-conceptuality is a characteristic of perception proclaimed by the Buddhists already before Dignāga (whose definition of *pratyakṣa* will be completed by Dharmakīrti); see Hattori 1968: 82–83.

¹⁹ This etymological definition (*akṣam akṣaṁ prati vartata iti pratyakṣam*) is a quotation of Dignāga, *Nyāyamukha*; see Hattori 1968: 76–77. It is repeated in *Nyāyapraveśa* § 4 (a treatise based on Dignāga’s one, by his disciple Śaṅkara-svāmin; see Tachikawa 1971); also quoted by Candrakīrti (*Prasannapadā*, p. 72/1–2), who criticizes it (see Arnold 2005: 179, 278 n. 17) and, in the eighth century, by the Buddhist Dharmottara and Kamalaśīla (*Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā*). Compare the close definition of NSBh 1.1.3: *akṣasyākṣasya prativṛtṭiḥ pratyakṣam*.

²⁰ Compare NSBh 1.1.3: *mitena liṅgena liṅgino ’rthasya paścān mānam anumānam*; and 5: *anena liṅgalīṅginoḥ saṁbandhadarśanam, liṅgadarśanam cābhisāmbadhyate; liṅgalīṅginoḥ saṁbaddhāyora darśanena liṅgasmytir abhisāmbadhyate; smṛtyā liṅgadarśanena cāpratyakṣo ’rtho ’numīyate*. This is nevertheless not a direct quotation; see Hattori 1968: 77–78.

²¹ Compare NS 1.1.6: *prasiddhasādharmyāt*

sādhyasāadhanam upamānam, which adds more explicitly “through similarity/likeness” or, more precisely, “community of properties with” (*-sādharmyāt*).

²² The text must be here read: *mudgaḥ stambhanas tathā* (-ḥ/s + st- > -st- is grammatically allowed, and common in Malayalam Mss.). This botanical example is also found (without the *stambhanatva* common property) in NSBh 1.1.6, which further notes the usefulness of *upamāna* in the Āyurvedic context: *yathā mudgas tathā mudgaparṇī, yathā māśas [another bean] tathā māśaparṇīty [a leguminous shrub] upamāne prayukte upamānāt saṁjñāsaṁjñīsaṁbandham pratipadyamānas tāṁ tāṁ ośadhīm bhaiṣajyāyā āharati* (“... through *upamāna* he [= the physician] learns the connection between the name/the designation [of the object] and the named/designated [object] and thereby uses the particular herb required for his medicine”). Would Vācaspati Mīśra have had a corrupt text of the RVSBh (or of its source) in mind when in his own commentary on NSBh (1.1.4) he uses the compound *mudga-stamba* “a tuft of *mudga*” in quoting the same example (*yathā mudgastambas tathā mudgaparṇīti*)?

Tradition (*āgama*) is the speech of experts (*āpta-vacana*); the expert is [someone] devoid of faults.²³ His speech is of three sorts: “that whose object(s) is/are to be believed” (*śraddheya-artha*), “that whose object(s) is/are imperceptible” (*apratyakṣa-artha*) and “that whose object(s) is/are to be inferred” (*anumeya-artha*); such is the threefold [traditional speech] that is seen [distinctively] in the treatises.²⁴

Implication (*arthāpatti*) is, on the basis of a stated meaning, the [necessary] coming (*āgamana*) of an unstated [meaning]: in the statement “Devadatta does not eat at night,” it ensues from the meaning/is implied (*arthād ā-PAD*) that “Devadatta eats during the day-time;”²⁵ the regular activity of eating (*āhāra-kriyā*) leads to (*gamayati*) the adequacy of [this second] meaning (*artha-sāmarthyā*), because of the natural relation [between day and night (?),] for the maintenance of [Devadatta’s] body.²⁶

²³ Compare the two verses quoted by Gauḍapāda *ad* SK 4 (or 5 in the com. of Māṭhara): *āgamaḥ hy āptavacanam āptaṃ doṣakṣayād viduḥ / kṣīṇadoṣaḥ (...)* *āpto jñeyaḥ sa tādṛśaḥ* //; *Jayamaṅgalā ad loc.*: *āptaḥ kṣīṇadoṣas tena yad ucyate tad āptavacanam āgamaḥ*, and to SK 5: *āptaḥ kṣīṇadoṣaḥ*. See also Candrakīrti’s *Prasannapādā*, p. 75/6–7: *sākṣād atīndriyārthavidām āptānāṃ yadvacanam sa āgamaḥ*. Note that the word *āgama*, occurring elsewhere in the *sūtra*-text (replaced by *upadeśa* in 3,108; cf. *āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ* NS 1,1.7), is glossed by *śruti* in RVSBh 1,120, and by *śāstra* = *āyurveda* in 1,140.

²⁴ The triple distinction concerning the object(s) of tradition, which finds a parallel in YSBh 1,7 (see footnote 37 below), will be explained later, in the light of RVSBh 3,44–45. It should already be pointed out that the non-perceptibility here stated concerns the non-experts (i.e., the common people), for there is of course perceptibility for the experts. See below fn. 36 and, for more references on the *āptas*, Vielle 2017: fn. 21–22 and 38.

²⁵ Compare CS 3,8.48 on *arthaprāpti*: *yatra_ekena_arthena_uktena_aparasya_arthasya_anuktasya_api_siddhiḥ* (with *apara* meaning “other”); and NSBh 2,2.1: *arthād āpattir [=] arthāpattih; āpattih [=] prāptih [=]*

prasaṅgaḥ; yatra_abhidhīyamāne_rthe_yo_nyo_rthaḥ_prasajyate_so_rthāpattih. The example here given of *śruta-arthāpatti* (remaining at the level of the heard statement, not of the real observation of the fact or “state of affairs”) is found in the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsā (see Kumārila’s *Ślokovārttika* 5,7.51 sq.: *pīno divā na bhuṅkte...*); it is criticized by the Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsaka Śālikanātha (*Prakaraṇapañcikā* 6 [*Pramāṇapārāyaṇa*], 5 [*arthāpatti*], pp. 278–279 ed. A. Subrahmanya Sastri), following his own definition of the [*dṛṣṭa*]-*arthāpatti*; it is reduced to inference by Māṭhara in his commentary to SK 4: *tatra pīno devadatto divā na bhuṅkta ity ukte rātrau bhuṅkta ity arthaḥ, sārthāpattir anumānam eva*; likewise by Gauḍapāda and in *Jayamaṅgalā ad loc.*

²⁶ The punctuation of the editions has here been changed, and *āhāra-kriyā* is disjoined from *saṃbaddhatvāt* in order to provide a subject to *gamayati*. That *saṃbaddhatva* concerns the mutually exclusive couple night-day relies on the terms of the critics of Kumārila’s (slightly different) example found in Śālikanātha’s *Prakaraṇapañcikā* 6,5, p. 279/3–6: *rātrisaṃbandhe hy anavagata bhojanasya_anupapattih; kālasaṃbandhābhāvena hy eṣā_anupapattih, sā kālāntarasambandham eva kalpayitum alam* (cf. p. 280/8–10).

That which is called inclusion (*saṁbhava*) refers to a meaning that is inherent (*avinābhāvin*):²⁷ for example, in stating [the measure] *prastha* is included (*saṁbhavati*) [the measure] *kuḍuba*, [or] in [stating the measure] *āḍhaka* [is included the measure] *prastha*.²⁸ (RVSBh 4.70)

The six *pramāṇas* listed in the *sūtra* of Nāgārjuna correspond, aside from the last one (*saṁbhava*), to the six means recognized as such by the theories of knowledge of the most orthodox and conservative among Brahmanical traditions, namely the two Mīmāṃsās; such a list (with the more speculative *abhāva* instead of the proportional *saṁbhava*) is attributed to their co-founder, the sage Jaimini.²⁹ The logic of the Nyāya reduced these means of valid knowledge to the first four items (of the present list),³⁰ whereas that of classical

27 The RVSBh editions write here *avinābhāvin* *vīyo* 'rthaḥ which has to be read *avinābhāvin* *yo* 'rthaḥ.

28 Compare NSBh 2.2.1: *saṁbhavo nāmāvinābhāvino* 'rthasya *sattāgrahaṇād anyasya sattāgrahaṇam, yathā droṇasya sattāgrahaṇād āḍhakasya sattāgrahaṇam, āḍhakasya sattāgrahaṇāt prasthasyeti*, where *saṁbhava* is defined as "the grasping of the reality of another [meaning] from the grasping of the reality of a meaning which is inherent in/does not exist without (*avinābhāvin*) [the former meaning]." Again, we are here at the conceptual level of *artha* as [object of] "meaning." For the example in RVSBh, see Gauḍapāda *ad* SK 4: *saṁbhavo yathā prastha ity ukte catvāraḥ kuḍavāḥ saṁbhāvyaṇte*; likewise Māṭhara and the *Jayamaṅgalā ad loc.* (the Malayalam Mss. of the latter, like in the RVSBh, write *kuḍubāḥ* instead of *kuḍavāḥ*; *kuḍuba* is the common Malayalam spelling); by contrast, the *Yuktidīpikā* uses the weight units *prastha* and *droṇa* only (*saṁbhavo nāma droṇaḥ prastha ity ukte* 'rdhadroṇādīnām *saṁnidhānam avasīyate*), as in the NSBh (which adds the *āḍhaka*).

29 See Gauḍapāda *ad* SK 4: *ṣaṭ pramāṇāni jaiminiḥ*; *Yuktidīpikā ad loc.*: *ṣaḍ ity anye*, with the quotation: *pratyakṣam anumānam ca śabdaṁ copamayā saha / arthāpattir abhāvaś ca hetavaḥ sadhyasādhakāḥ* //, a

śloka which is also given in the Tibetan version of (the 6th century Buddhist) Bhavya's *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* ch. 9 (on Mīmāṃsā), k. 7' (see Kawasaki 1974: 3–4); *Mañimēkalai* 27.5–85 (see Ramaswami Sastri 1934: 434; Parpola 1981: 154 fn. 36; Nicholson 2010: 149–150); *Prapañcahrdaya* (Sāstrī 1915: ch. 7, p. 67/7–15): *pratyakṣānumānopamānārthāpattiyāgamābhāva* (...) *ṣaṭpramāṇa* (...) *iti jaimini-matam* (cf. ch. 4, p. 40/3: *pratyakṣādilaukikapramāṇaiḥ ṣaḍbhiḥ*). This sixfold list is also indirectly attested in Śabara's *Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya* when he explains *ad* MS 1.1.4–5 that, because of the inadequacy of the other five means (*pratyakṣapūrvakatvāc cānumānopamānārthāpattīnām apy akāraṇatvam; abhāvo* 'pi *nāsti*, MSBh 1.1.4), only *upadeśa* is valid for knowing the *dharma* (... *tasya* [*dharma*sya] *jñānam upadeśaḥ... tat pramāṇam...*, MS 1.1.5).

30 See *Yuktidīpikā ad* SK 4a: *tantrāntarīyāḥ ke cit catvāri pramāṇānīcchanti*, "pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ *pramāṇānīti*" (= NS 1.1.3) *vacanāt*; Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, p. 75/9: *tad evaṁ pramāṇa-catuṣṭayāl lokasyārthādhigamo vyavasthāpyate*; *Prapañcahrdaya* ch. 4, p. 42/16, and ch. 6, p. 63/16–19. Same list in *Suśrutasaṁhitā* 1.1.16: *pratyakṣāgamānumānopamāna*.

Sāṃkhya³¹ reduced them to three³² and that of the Buddhist Dignāga (as well as in Vaiśeṣika) reduced them to two only.³³

The commentator Narasiṃha demonstrates through his concise definitions and his pertinent examples the practical medical usefulness of the six means of knowledge he retains, without bothering to look into their deeper nature.

His threefold classification of tradition (*āgama*)³⁴ is noteworthy and requires further elucidation. He provides this explanation himself in his commentary to *sūtra* 44 of the third *adhyāya* (cf. the appendix at the end for the Sanskrit text), where the word *anumāna* is to be understood as *anumeyārtha-āgama*:

For the objects that are at first apprehended by means of tradition, the present [*sūtra*] is undertaken in order to specify that they are/were confirmed by means of another *pramāṇa*. For the speech of experts (= *āgama*) is of three sorts: “referring to objects of belief” (*śraddheya-artha*), “referring to objects to be inferred” (*anumeya-artha*) and “referring to objects of perception” (*pratyakṣa-artha*). [Traditional speech] referring to objects of belief is when it is said that there exist Hyperboreans or celestial nymphs.³⁵ That which refers to objects of

³¹ See *Prapañcahṛdaya* ch. 6, p. 66/11–16: *pratyakṣānumānāgama- (...)*. The *Kalpanā-maṇḍitikā Drṣṭāntapañkti* of Kumāralāta (2nd–3rd centuries CE) preserved in Chinese translation (as being Aśvaghōṣa’s *Sūtrālamkāra*, cf. its French translation by É. Huber, 1908, pp. 15–16) refers to an earlier Sāṃkhya-sūtras’ doctrine of five *pramāṇas*: verbal testimony (*śabda* or *āgama*), cause (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), equality (*saṃbhava*), absolute certainty (*sākṣāt-pratīti* = *pratyakṣa*), and to the fact that other Sāṃkhya treatises do not accept *upamāna*.

³² Cf. also YS 1,7 (*pratyakṣānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇāni*; for YSBh, see footnote 37 below), *Manusmṛti* 12.105ab (*pratyakṣaṃ cānumānaṃ ca śāstraṃ ca vividhāgamam*) and CS 3,4.1–7 (following Ātreya’s teaching), 8.83, 4.1.45 and 6.28. However, the doctrine of Caraka is not so clear in the matter since he adds in 1.11.17–33 a fourth *pramāṇa* called *yukti* (see P.-S. Filliozat 1990), and treats also of several other *pramāṇas* (without naming them as such) in 3.8.33–49 (see Vielle 2017: fn. 34); see J. Filliozat 1970: 84, Preisendanz 2013: 102–118. Cf. also in CS 1,12.8,

for *pratyakṣānumānopadeśaiḥ sādhayitvā* (text as given in the vulgate edition), the variant readings: *pratyakṣānumānopamānāiḥ*, *pratyakṣānumānopamānopadeśaiḥ* etc. as noted by J. Filliozat 1949: 163 fn. 7, 166 fn. 2 (“Le texte a donc été modifié respectivement par des tenants du Nyāya et du Sāṃkhya”).

³³ See *Yuktidīpikā ad SK* 4a: *pratyakṣānumāne eveti vaiśeṣika-bauddhāḥ*. However, the Madhyamaka tradition still admits *āgama* among *pramāṇas* as pointed out by Eltschinger (2014: 199 fn. 25). As for the Vaiśeṣika, it appears that starting with Praśastapāda and his followers (*ad VS* 9,2.5), the means were reduced to two; however, *Mañimēkalai* 27.78–85 ascribes five *pramāṇas* to the Vaiśeṣika (see Nicholson 2010: 150), and *āgama* is counted as one of the three valid means for the Vaiśeṣika in *Prapañcahṛdaya* ch. 6, pp. 64/19–65/1 (cf. the same, p. 62/9–11, for the two means of the Bauddhas).

³⁴ See above fn. 24. This threefold classification is also hinted at by Sankaranarayana and Pavana 2016: 6.

³⁵ The same double example, with the Apsaras and the Uttarakurus, is found

inference and perception is like when it is said that the eye's faculty is to grasp form-and-colour. While the eye exists (as an organ), [the faculty] is not [there] (i.e., directly observable). Therefore, when it is said that there is an eye's faculty it is inferred. [But] it is on the basis of perception when it is said that a form-and-colour is apprehended. The tradition referred to here (i.e., in this *sūtra*) is that whose object(s) is/are to be inferred.³⁶ (RVSBh 3,44)

And Narasiṃha adds to this, in the commentary to the next *sūtra* (3,45):

Indeed in Āyurveda, aside from the two [types] of tradition, [viz.] that referring to objects of perception and that referring to objects of inference, there is no reference to object(s) of belief,³⁷ due to the vis-

in *Yuktidīpikā ad SK 4a*, within a discussion whether *upamāna* can be reduced to *āgama*: *yadi hy āptopadeśa upamā syāt tena yathā svarge 'psarasah, uttarāḥ kurava ity evamādiṣv antareṇa sādharṃyopādānaṃ pratipattir bhavaty evam ihāpi syāt*.

³⁶ The author is here dealing with traditional statements as truths previously established by experts through (their own) perceptions and/or inferences. Of course thereafter many of these truths can be "verified" by the physician or even, for some, by the common people (cf. Thirumulpad 2010: 164; for instance, knowledge of a form-and-colour is the same example he gives in its definition of *pratyakṣa* seen above), but, despite the ambiguity of the introductory sentence, this is not the point here, especially because many things perceived or inferred by the experts ("who clearly know objects beyond the faculties of senses," *sākṣād atīndriyārthavid*, according to Candrakīrti quoted fn. 23 above; cf. the *atīndriya-darśana* ascribed to the *āptas* by the Nayāyikas Bhāsarvajña and Udayana, like the *atīndriya-jñāna* ascribed to the yogins by Dharmakīrti) cannot be perceived/inferred by the non-experts, possibly also by the common physician, who, therefore, must at first rely on medical doctrine as taught by tradition (cf. RSV 3,60–61 and fn. 5 above and 41 below).

³⁷ Compare YSBh 1,7: *āptena dṛṣṭo 'numito vārthaḥ pratira svabodhasaṃkrāntaye śabdeno-*

padiśyate, śabdāt tadarthaviśayā vṛttiḥ śrotur āgamaḥ; yasya āśraddheya-artho vaktā na dṛṣṭa-anumita-arthaḥ sa āgamaḥ plavate; mūlavaktari dṛṣṭa-anumita-arthe nirviplavaḥ syāt. This YSBh triple characterisation of *āgama* as *dṛṣṭa-/anumita-/āśraddheya-artha* is comparable to RVSBh 3,44 and 4,70 which has (a) *pratyakṣa-/anumeya-/śraddheya-artha* (the initial *a-* depends on the adopted perspective, cf. above fn. 24). On YSBh 1,7, see Maas 2016: 388 (= 2010, p. 376), with translation. Like the RVSBh here, the YSBh says that there are only two types of tradition at work in its teaching: that based on perception and that based on inference. However, while the YSBh firmly condemns as being "whose object(s) is/are not to be believed" (*āśraddheyārtha*) anything that, in the Yoga tradition itself, would be stated without having been seen or inferred by the experts, less radically the RVSBh, without ever specifying *śraddheyārtha* type of tradition as untrustworthy, says that it is found in *tantras* (see RVSBh 4,70 above), i.e., in treatises that are, presumably, different from the Āyurvedic ones, and even sometimes (contrary to the present statement) in Āyurveda: thus in RVSBh 1,2 the tradition ascribed to the sage Bharadvāja, reverently presented as a (Vedic) *maharṣi* and a (Āyurvedin) *bhagavān* (master of Ātreya according to CS 1,4.5), from whom a few *śloka*s are quoted, is qualified as a *śraddheyārtha āgamaḥ* (which is not surprising in a Buddhist perspective).

ible (*dr̥ṣṭa*) nature of the fruit (*phala* – effect/result) [of this knowledge].³⁸

This is a profession of faith of the realist, not to say the positivist, variety: that which the expert physician has taught, he has either “seen”/perceived directly,³⁹ or else “inferred,”⁴⁰ but even in the latter case his reasoning concerns an invisible/imperceptible phenomenon that pertains to observable reality, not to the domain of unfounded beliefs. Likewise, the results of his scientific practice pertain to the realm of observable facts. The medical tradition can thus never consist in “blind” faith. It is in this respect that Nāgārjuna can declare, like Caraka, that tradition comes first.⁴¹ Tradition, direct observation and reasoning go hand in hand in medical analysis.⁴² Tradition comes first, but once it has been mastered perfectly, observation and reasoning are sufficient,⁴³ as has always been the case and always will be for the expert masters of the tradition. There is even a true form of empiricism in the scientific approach of the RVS author who, as pointed out by Meulenbeld, “repeatedly express rejection of a hierarchical ordering of concepts, (...) though this type of order is a characteristic of the early [medical]

38 RVSBh 3,45: *na hy āyurvede pratyakṣārthānumeyārthābhyām āgamābhyām anyac chraddheyārthatvam asti, dr̥ṣṭaphalatvād iti.*

39 See NSBh 2,1.68 on Āyurveda as an experts teaching whose object is “seen:” *dr̥ṣṭa-arthena āptopadeśena āyurvedena* (in contrast with *adr̥ṣṭa-artho veda-bhāgaḥ*).

40 With this restriction concerning *āgama*, we are in fact very close to Dharmakīrti’s criticism (himself relying on Dignāga) of *āgama-prāmāṇya* as found in *Pramāṇavārttika* 1.215 (cf. *svavṛtti* 108): *pratyakṣeṇānumānena dvividhenāpy abādhanam / dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭārthayor asyāvīṣaṃvādāsa tadarthayoḥ* // “The reliability of this [treatise claiming scriptural authority] with respect to perceptible as well as imperceptible objects consists in the fact that neither direct perception nor the two kinds of inference invalidate these objects [as they are described in the treatise]” (translation by Ratié 2017). On this verse and Dharmakīrti’s own explanation (*svavṛtti*) of it, see Eltschinger 2014: 211–213.

41 RVS 3,61: *tasmād viśeṣeṇāgama eva pramāṇaṃ cikitsāyām* “So, in treatment, it is tradition which is the [very] means of valid knowledge.” Cf. CS 3,4.5: *pūrvam*

āptopadeśāj jñānam. On *āptopadeśa* as the most important *pramāṇa* in Āyurveda, see also Mishra 2004: 426–452, Murali 2018, and Brooks 2018: 119–121.

42 Cf. RVS 3,108: *pratyakṣato ‘numānād upadeśataś ca rasānām upalabdhiḥ*, and RVSBh *ad loc.*; RVSBh 1,2: *tasmād āgama-virodhād yuktisadbhāvāc ca*; and 1,8: *evam anumānāgamapratyakṣavirodhāt*. Cf. CS 3,4.5: *trividhena khalv anena jñānasamudāyena pūrvam parikṣya rogaṃ sarvathā sarvam athottarakālam adhyavasānam adoṣaṃ bhavati, na hi jñānāvayavena kṛtsne jñeye jñānam utpadyate*.

43 See CS 3,8.83 (cf. 4.5): *dvividhā parikṣā jñānavatām – pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca; etat tu dvayam upadeśaś ca parikṣātrayam; evam eṣā dvividhā parikṣā, trividhā vā sahopadeśena*, “For those who have the knowledge (i.e., the *āptas*, instructed by tradition), the examination is of two kinds: perception and inference; these are the two [kinds], and [with] the [experts] teaching [these are] the three [kinds] of examination; such is the examination: of two kinds, or of three kinds in including *upadeśa*.”

saṃhitās,” and insists “on medical experience as the decisive factor on which to base an appraisal of the relative importance of all these concepts.”⁴⁴

Nāgārjuna also grants due scientific value to three useful supplementary means of knowledge, which allow one, as part of one’s medical practice, to classify (medicinal plants, among other things) according to specific criteria, to presume what is necessary (concerning the patient), or to measure out (the remedies) accurately. As specified by Narasiṃha, there are thus means of knowing for instance that a “*mudga* leaf” is a styptic, that “Devadatta eats during the daytime,” or what the ratio of the measures *prastha*, *kuḍuba* and *ādhaka* is, which enables the physician to prescribe, as needed, an appropriate diet or treatment.

Even if the same last three examples are also found in other, non-medical, sources, the importance attached to the epistemological question of the means of valid knowledge in RVS(Bh) as well as in Caraka⁴⁵ is noteworthy and can be viewed as an indication of the milieu in which the *pramāṇa* theory, if not originated,⁴⁶ at least was practically used, and tested, in an experimental way.

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44 HIML: vol 2A, 137. Cf. RVS 1,94 (discussing *agni*, *bala* and *sātmya*): *na yuktam avadhāraṇam idam eva pradhānam idam neti, cikitsāyāṃ hi pradhānam avasthānuvidhānam*, “It is incorrect to a priori state that such [concept] only is the most important [and] such [other] is not: for in treatment, the most important is to be/act in conformity with the situation;” 1,163 (same sentence applied to the series *dravya*, *rasa*, *guṇa*, *vīrya*, *vipāka*): *na yuktam avadhāraṇam idam eva pradhānam idam neti, cikitsāyāṃ dravyādiṣu vastuṣu* (RVSBh: *idam eva pradhānam cikitsāyāṃ ity avadhāraṇam na yuktam, ekāntabhāvāśrayaṇam ayuktam ity arthaḥ*), and 164: *yathāviśayaṃ hi prādhānyaṃ sarveṣāṃ*, “It is indeed relatively to [each peculiar]

field/object (or “according to the context,” Thirumulpad) that for all [these concepts] a [main] importance [is to be ascribed to one or to another];” or 4,30: *karmanānumeyā saṃpattiḥ*, “The efficacy [of *vīrya*] has to be inferred through action/result (RVSBh: *karmanā = phalena*),” that is “by experience” (Thirumulpad).

45 Cf. fn. 32 above. For the importance of the *pramāṇa* theory in modern Āyurveda teaching, see the syllabus of Mishra 2004: 336–470.

46 As it has sometimes been assumed; see for instance J. Filliozat 1970: 83–84, 88, and, more recently, Lusthaus 2011: 139–140, 157–162.

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APPENDIX – EXTRACTS FROM THE RASAVAIŚEŚIKASŪTRA AND ITS COMMENTARY

Variant readings from the 1928/1976 editions are given in footnotes.

- 1° The two introductory stanzas of the commentary (Menon 1928:1; Muthuswami 1976:1):

*prajñāyattam idaṃ hi naikaviśayaṃ śāstrādhigamyam phalaṃ śakyam naiva hi cādhigantum amalam*⁴⁷ *hitvā parīkṣāspadam |*
 [--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---] *bravīd*⁴⁸
āyurvedapadārthatattvaviduṣāṃ cakṣuḥ paraṃ nirmalam || 1 ||
siddhāntāntarāniścītārthagahanam hetvarthatattvānugam
tyaktvānekavipañcanārthapadaṇḍam vyaktārthaśabdātmakam |
prītyartham viduṣāṃ anugrahakaram mandātmanām sarvadā
tasyedaṃ parīkṣītārthaviśayaṃ bhāṣyam mayā kathyate || 2 ||

- 2° RVS 3,44 and its commentary (Menon 1928:147; Muthuswami 1976:107):

te nirdhāryante 'numānāt || 3.44 ||

āgamena pūrvam upalabdhānām pramāṇāntareṇa dṛḍhīkaraṇārtham
ayam ārambhaḥ | āptavacanasya traividhyāt | śraddheyā(rtha)m
anumeyārtham pratyakṣārtham ceti | śraddheyārtham uttarāḥ kura-
vah, svarge 'psarasa iti | anumeyārtham pratyakṣārtham ca yathā
cakṣurindriyam rūpasya grāhakam iti | cakṣuṣi sati na bhavati |
tasmād asti cakṣurindriyam ity anumīyate | pratyakṣata eva rūpam
upalabhyata iti | ihāpy ayam āgamo 'numeyārthaḥ ||

- 3° RVS 4,70 and its commentary (Menon 1928:204–205; Muthuswami 1976:148):

pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamārthāpattisaṃbhavāḥ pramāṇāni || 4.70 ||

⁴⁷ *cādhigantum amalam* em. : *sādhigantum-amalā* Ed. (see above fn. 8).

⁴⁸ [*yat sūtram suviśiṣṭasarvarasadam*

nāgārjunah prā] *bravīd* : [*tacchāstram rasabhai-dikābhidamidam nāgārjunah prā*]° Ed. (see above fn. 8).

*iti | etāni hi pramāṇāni laukikalokāntarāṇām arthānām adhigamo-
pāyāni, “pramāṇādhiṇatvāt prameyādhigamasya” iti | pramāṇaṃ
prameyaṃ pramātā pramitir iti catasṛṣu vidhāsu lokavyavahāraḥ
pravartate | yathā vrīhyadiḥ prameyo ’dhigataparicchedāsthitaḥ |
tasya paricchedārthaṃ prasthādi pramāṇam upadīyate | tatra pramātā
devadatto hastena prasthādinā pramāṇena pramiṇvan tasya vrīhyader
iyattāparicchedapramitim udbhāvayati | tāṃ pramitim upalabhamāno
vyavaharati_iti | +++++++bhaḥ |⁴⁹ pratyakṣādibhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ
prameyāṇi chāstrārthān tattatpramāṇayogād vaidyaḥ pramātā pramiṇ-
van samyagjñānākhyāṃ pratītim udbhāvayati | sā hi sarvasya sādhiḥ |
uktaṃ hi —*

*“buddher⁵⁰ bodhyāni śāstrāṇi sūkṣmais tattvārthanīścayaiḥ |
tattvārthagrahaṇā buddhir naiṣā sarvatra vidyate ||”*

*iti | eteṣāṃ pratyakṣādīnāṃ lakṣaṇanirūpaṇe tantrāntaraprasaṅgān na
nirūpyate | kiñ cit pulākamātram ucyate | indriyajñānam avikalpaṃ
pratyakṣaṃ, yathā rasajñānaṃ rūpajñānaṃ iti | akṣam akṣaṃ prati
vartata iti pratyakṣam | liṅgadarśanāl liṅgini pratipattir anumā-
nam | liṅgajñānāt sambandhānusmaraṇāc ca paścāj jñāyata ity
anumānam | prasiddhenāprasiddhasya sādhanam upamānam | yathā
mudgaḥ stambhanas tathā⁵¹ mudgaparṇīti | āgama āptavacanam |
āptaḥ kṣīnadoṣaḥ | tasya vacanaṃ trividham — śraddheyārtham
apratyakṣārtham anumeyārtham iti | etat trayam tantreṣu draṣṭavyam |
uktenārthenānuktasyāgamanam arthāpattiḥ | rātrau na bhuṅkte
devadatta ity ukte, arthād āpadyate divā bhuṅkte iti | arthasāmarthyam
gamayaty āhārakriyā sambaddhatvāc charīrasthiteḥ |⁵² sambhavo
nāma avinābhāvī yo ’rthaḥ⁵³ | yathā prastha ity ukte kuḍubas tatra
sambhavati, yathāḍhake prastha iti ||*

49 +++++++bhaḥ | : +++++++bhaḥ
(without *danḍa*) Ed. (see footnote 16
above).

50 buddherbodhyāni Ed. 1976 : buddhir-
bodhyāni Ed. 1928 (see footnote 17 above).

51 mudgaḥ stambhanas tathā : mudgastambha-
nas tathā Ed. (see footnote 22 above).

52 arthāpattiḥ | rātrau na bhuṅkte devadatta ity
ukte, arthād āpadyate divā bhuṅkte iti | arthasā-

marthyam gamayaty āhārakriyā sambaddhatvāc
charīrasthiteḥ : arthāpattiḥ rātrau na bhuṅkte
devadatta ityukte arthādāpadyate divā bhuṅkte
ityarthasāmarthyam gamayati, āhārakriyāsam-
baddhatvāccharīrasthiteḥ Ed. (see footnote 26
above).

53 avinābhāvī yo ’rthaḥ : avinābhāvīyo’rthaḥ
Ed. (see footnote 27 above).

ABBREVIATIONS

CS	<i>Carakasamhitā</i>
HIML	Meulenbeld, <i>A History of Indian Medical Literature</i>
MW	Monier-Williams Dictionary
MS	<i>Mīmāṃsāsūtra</i>
MSBh	Śabara's <i>Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya</i>
NS	<i>Nyāyasūtra</i>
NSBh	<i>Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya</i>
RVS	<i>Rasavaiśeṣikasūtra</i>
RVSb	Narasimha's <i>Rasavaiśeṣikasūtrabhāṣya</i>
SK	<i>Sāṃkhyakārikās</i>
TLB	<i>Thesaurus Literaturae Buddhicae</i>
VS	<i>Vaiśeṣikasūtra</i>
YS	<i>Yogasūtra</i>
YSBh	Vyāsa's <i>Yogasūtrabhāṣya</i> (<i>Pātāñjalayogaśāstra</i>)

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